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Résumé / Abstract 
 
On construit un mod￨le d’un jeu dynamique d’￩change en ressource non-renouvelable sous 
l’hypoth￨se que le pays exportateur d￩termine la quantité au lieu du prix. L’objectif est de 
comparer l’￩quilibre de Nash avec les ￩quilibres de Stackelberg. Dans un premier temps, c’est 
le pays importateur qui est le leader. Dans un deuxième temps, le pays exportateur assume le 
leadership. On démontre num￩riquement que, par rapport à l’￩quilibre de Nash , le niveau de 
bien-être  des  deux  pays  est  plus  ￩lev￩  sous  l’équilibre  de  Stackelberg  dans  le  cas  où 
l’importateur est le leader. Dans le cas où le pays exportateur est le leader, le niveau de bien-
être du pays importateur est moins ￩lev￩ que celui de l’￩quilibre de Nash. Le bien-être du 
monde entier dans le cas du leadership du pays importateur est plus élevé que dans le cas 
opposé. 
 




Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares 
feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria when the exporting country sets quantity rather 
than  price.  We  consider  two  different  leadership  scenarios:  leadership  by  the  importing 
country, and leadership by the exporting country. We numerically show that as compared to 
the Nash equilibrium, both countries are better off if the importing country is a leader, but 
that the follower is worse off if the exporting country is a leader. Consequently, the world 
welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting 
country's leadership. 
 
Keywords: dynamic game, exhaustible resource, Stackelberg leadership. 
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The world markets for gas and oils consist mainly of a small number of large
sellers and buyers. For instance, the U.S. Energy Information Administration
reports that the major energy exporters concentrate on the Middle East
and Russia whereas the United States, Japan and China have a substantial
share in the imports.1 These data suggest that bilateral monopoly roughly
prevails in the oil market in which both parties exercise market power. What
are the implications of market power for welfare of importing and exporting
countries, and the world?
There is a large literature that attempts to answer this question by using
a dynamic game. Newbery (1976) and Kemp and Long (1980) are among the
earliest contributions, showing that the optimal tariﬀ is time inconsistent in
an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.2 In order to overcome this diﬃculty,
Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992) consider a feedback (Markovian) model in
which importing countries play a dynamic game with perfectly competitive
exporters. Karp and Newbery (1991) compare two situations, in one of which
the importing countries are the ﬁrst movers in each period while in the other
the competitive exporters choose their outputs before the importing countries
set their tariﬀ rates. They numerically demonstrate that being the ﬁrst-
mover can be disadvantageous. In a related paper, Karp and Newbery (1992)
make a welfare comparison between free trade and the Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium.
While Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992) assume perfect competition among
suppliers, Wirl (1994) considers the bilateral monopoly case, when both the
importing and exporting countries have market power, and computes a feed-
back Nash equilibrium. His novel result is that resource extraction is more
conservative than the globally eﬃcient level, but that along the equilibrium
1The latest data are available at http://www.eia.gov/.
2The time consistency issue is further studied by Karp (1984) who assumes that produc-
tion cost depends on the resource stock. Newbery (1981) does not deal with the optimal
tariﬀ issues, but points another type of time inconsistency when a cartel is the open-loop
Stackelberg leader and a fringe of competitive producers acts as the followers.
2path, the remaining stock converges to the eﬃcient steady state level.3 His
model has been extended in several ways. Chou and Long (2009), main-
taining the assumption of Nash behavior, extend the model to accommodate
many importers and compare welfare in free trade and the Nash equilibrium.
Tahvonen (1996) and Rubio and Escriche (2001) turn attention to Stack-
elberg games. Both papers show that outcome of the Nash equilibrium is
identical to that of the Stackelberg equilibrium where the exporting country
leads.4
This paper is also in line with this bilateral monopoly literature, but our
model and purpose are quite diﬀerent. First, we consider the case where
the seller chooses quantity whereas all of the above papers assume price-
setting behavior. Given the fact that recent price ﬂuctuations of oil are par-
tially caused by quantity control by the resource-rich countries, our quantity-
setting formulation seems more plausible. Second, we compare welfare of each
country and the world in the Nash equilibrium and the two Stackelberg equi-
libria where the leadership role is taken by the importer and the exporter,
respectively. Third and most importantly, we derive feedback Stackelberg
equilibria which are conceptually diﬀerent from Tahvonen (1996) and Rubio
and Escriche (2001). Roughly speaking, they assume that the leader moves
ﬁrst in each period, but does not necessarily try to improve upon its Nash
equilibrium payoﬀ stream. Such a solution may be called a stagewise Stack-
elberg equilibrium. In contrast, since we suppose that the leader determines
a Markovian rule over the entire horizon of the game, a solution concept that
may be called a global Stackelberg equilibrium.5 With these diﬀerences, we
establish that (i) as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both the exporting
country and the (strategically-behaving) importing country are better oﬀ if
3In the steady state, a positive resource stock remains in the ground even though extrac-
tion is costless. This is because a Pigouvian tax that corrects stock-pollution externalities
chokes oﬀ the demand.
4While Wirl (1994) assumes costless extraction, Tahvonen postulates a quadratic ex-
traction cost function, and the other two papers assume a stock-dependent cost.
5This concept is discussed in Dockner et al. (2000), Basar and Olsder (1995), Mehlmann
(1988), and Long (2010).
3the importing country leads, (ii) the importing country becomes worse oﬀ
if the exporting country leads, and (iii) the world welfare is highest under
the importing country’s leadership and lowest under the exporting country’s
leadership. Therefore, the important implication derived from our ﬁndings
is that the importing country should have a leadership over the exporting
country.
These ﬁndings are in sharp contrast to the results of Tahvonen (1996)
and Rubio and Escriche (2001) that the exporting country’s welfare under
its leadership is the same as in the Nash equilibrium. They are also in sharp
contrast to the price-setting model of Fujiwara and Long (2011) where the
world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium.6
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section 3
derives the feedback Nash equilibrium. Sections 4 characterizes the feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium in which the importing country is the leader. Section
5, on the other hand, turns to the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in which
the exporting country leads. Section 6 presents numerical results. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Model
This section presents the model. There are three countries labeled Home,
Foreign, and ROW (the rest of the world). A Foreign monopolistic ﬁrm
exports a good denoted by y to Home and ROW exclusively.7 This good
comes from the extraction of an exhaustible resource.
Due to geological factors, it is commonly observed that marginal extrac-
tion cost increases as the remaining stock of resource decreases.8 This feature
6Fujiwara and Long (2011) assume that the exporting country chooses prices, as in the
cited papers.
7The good is not consumed in Foreign, and the market of Home and ROW is assumed
to be integrated and hence the Foreign ﬁrm does not supply to each country separately.
8In a recent exposition of the state of the oil market, Smith (2009, p. 147) points out
that most of the oil in any given deposit will never be produced, and therefore does not
count as proved reserves, because it would be too costly to eﬀect complete recovery.” This
indicates that the “exhaustion” of a deposit should be interpreted as an “abandonment”
4has been taken into account by various authors. Our formulation of extrac-
tion cost is closest to that of Karp (1984).
Let X be the initial size of the deposit and X(t) be the stock of resource
that remains at time t, and deﬁne S(t)=X − X(t) ≥ 0. Then, marginal
extraction cost is increasing in S. Letting y(t) denote the extraction at time
t, the cost of extracting y(t) is assumed to be C =[ cA + cS(t)]y(t), where
cA ≥ 0 and c>0. In what follows, we set cA = 0 for simplicity. Our results
are not qualitatively aﬀected even if cA is positive.
Denote by a the maximum price that consumers would be willing to pay
for the ﬁrst unit of resource consumed at any t, which is called the choke price.
It is clear if marginal cost of extraction, cS(t), is higher than the choke price,
it is socially ineﬃcient to extract the resource. Therefore, extraction must
stop as soon as S(t) reaches the critical level S = a/c (if X is suﬃciently large
so that S can reach S before exhaustion). In what follows, we assume that X
is large enough so that the resource stock is abandoned before exhaustion.9
























2 ,a > 0,
where ui,i = H,ROW is utility of Home and ROW, and qi
1 and qi
2 are
consumption of the imported good and numeraire good, respectively. The
parameter b ∈ (0,1) represents the share of the Home demand in the world
demand if there is no tariﬀ. Assuming that the Home government imposes
a speciﬁc tariﬀ on the import of Good 1 and that ROW observes laissez-




1 = b(a − p − τ),q
ROW
1 =( 1− b)(a − p), (2)
of the deposit after the proﬁtable part has been exploited.
9Karp (1984) also focuses on this case.
10In what follows, the time argument t is suppressed unless any confusion arises.
5where p is the world price of Good 1 and τ is the tariﬀ imposed by Home. Let-
ting y be the total supply of the Foreign ﬁrm, the market-clearing condition
is
b(a − p − τ)+( 1− b)(a − p)=a − p − bτ = y,
from which the inverse demand function is deﬁned by p = a−y−bτ. Substi-
tuting this into (2) and (1), and considering that Home’s welfare W consists















b[y +( 1+b)τ][y − (1 − b)τ]
2
=
b[y2 +2 bτy − (1 − b2)τ2]
2
. (3)
On the other hand, the Foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt π is
π =( a − bτ − cS − y)y. (4)
Home and Foreign strategically choose a time proﬁle of τ and y by taking
into account the resource dynamics in an inﬁnite time horizon. Thus, the


















where r>0 is a common rate of discount. The subsequent sections ﬁnd the
Nash and Stackelberg solutions under linear feedback (Markovian) strategies.
3 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
This section considers a feedback Nash equilibrium of the above game. For
this purpose, let us deﬁne each player’s Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
6equation. By the assumption of simultaneous moves, Home does not ob-
serve the ﬁrm’s output y(t) when it makes the tariﬀ decision τ(t), and the
Foreign ﬁrm makes its output decision without knowing the tariﬀ rate τ(t).
Assume the Home government thinks that the Foreign ﬁrm has the output
strategy y = φ(S) while the Foreign ﬁrms thinks that the Home country has










y {[a − bψ(S) − cS − y]y + V
∗
S(S)y}, (5)
where V (S) and V ∗(S) are the value function of Home and Foreign. The ﬁrst-
order conditions for maximizing the right-hand side of the HJB equations
give
bφ(S) − (1 − b
2)τ =0
a − bψ(S) − cS − 2y + V
∗
S(S)=0 .
In equilibrium, what each player thinks about the other’s strategy is correct
and thus we have
τ = ψ(S)=
b(a − cS + V ∗
S)
2 − b2 (6)
y = φ(S)=
(1 − b2)(a − cS + V ∗
S)
2 − b2 .. (7)










Let us guess that the value function is quadratic in S because of our















where A∗,B∗ and C∗ are to be determined. Equating the coeﬃcients of the
terms S2,S, and the constant terms on both sides of the equation, we get
A
∗ =
4c(1 − b2)2 + r(2 − b2)2 − (2 − b2)
√
Δ




























In a similar way, we can obtain the coeﬃcients of Home’s value function











































Accordingly, in the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (hereafter, MPNE), the
tariﬀ strategy and the output strategy are








4(1 − b2)2 S −
b
 

























Using these results, we can arrive at:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique feedback Nash equilibrium in linear
strategies where both the equilibrium tariﬀ and output converge to zero.
Proof. The resource dynamics in linear strategies is























Thus, as S(t) approaches the steady state S∞ = a/c, we have y → 0 and
consequently τ → 0 because τ = by/(1 − b2). ||
84 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with Im-
porter’s Leadership
In this section and the next one we turn to two Stackelberg equi-
libria. This section considers the case where Home is the leader. In order
to solve the game backward, we begin by examining Foreign’s behavior. The
Foreign ﬁrm anticipates that the leader chooses a strategy τ(S)=αS + β.
Then, the Foreign ﬁrm’s HJB equation is
rV
∗(S) = max
y {[a − b(αS + β) − cS − y + V
∗
S(S)]y}.
Guessing V ∗(S)=A∗S2/2+B∗S + C∗, the ﬁrst-order condition for maxi-
mizing the right-hand side gives the follower’s reaction function:
y(S)=
(A∗ − bα − c)S + B∗ + a − bβ
2
. (16)




Applying this equation to the above speciﬁcation of the value function, the
three coeﬃcients will be
A
































Γ ≡ r(2bα +2 c + r) > 0.

















Let us turn to the solving the leader’s problem, which involves a few auxiliary
steps. First, considering that the resource dynamics is expressed by ˙ S =











Second, under the linear strategies τ = αS +β and y = α∗S +β∗, the Home




























































































where the last equation uses (21).
















































which is to be maximized by Home by controlling α and β. Since this is just
a static maximization problem, the optimal value of α and β is in principle
obtained with calculus only. However, one can see that the solutions of α
and β obtained through this method would depend on S0, which implies that
such solutions are time-inconsistent. In order to overcome this diﬃculty, we
impose a time consistency condition: the restriction that αa+βc = 0 so that
the second and the third terms in (22) vanish and the ﬁrst-order condition
becomes independent of S0.














































The ﬁrst-order condition for this maximization problem is
2b(2bα+2c+r)
 

























2 + ηθ + μ,
by transforming the variables such that θ =2 bα+2c+r. In the present case,
we can prove a result that is parallel to Proposition 1:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the importing country is a leader. Then, there
exists a unique global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear strategies where both
the equilibrium tariﬀ and output converge to zero.
Proof. Under the time consistency condition, we have










Thus, the steady state in which S = a/c involves τ(a/c) = 0, and y(a/c)=0
from (23). ||
115 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with Ex-
porter’s Leadership
Finally, this section deals with the case in which the Foreign ﬁrm is a leader.











The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields
τ(S)=
b(α∗S + β∗)
1 − b2 . (25)




























































































































which is maximized by Foreign that chooses α∗ and β∗.
In principle, we can ﬁnd the equilibrium strategy of the leader by seeking
α∗ and β∗ which maximize this function. However, such solutions can be
12time-inconsistent for the same reason as in the preceding section. Therefore,
we must impose once again the time consistency condition: α∗a + β∗c =0 .
Under it, the welfare of the leader becomes
−α∗[α∗ +( 1− b2)c]







which is to be maximized with respect to α∗. The associated ﬁrst-order
condition is
2α∗ − 2rα∗ − r(1 − b2)c
















Moreover, using (27), we can derive the coeﬃcients of the follower’s value
function V (S)=AS2/2+BS + C as follows.
A =
bα∗2
(1 − b2)(r − 2α∗)
B =
bα∗β∗




2(1 − b2)(r − 2α∗)
. (28)
Based on these results, we can prove a result that is parallel to Propositions
1 and 2:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the exporting country is a leader. Then, there
exists a unique global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear strategies where both
the equilibrium tariﬀ and output converge to zero.












Hence, in the steady state such that S = a/c, both y(S) and τ(S) converges
to zero. ||
136 Welfare Implications
Having derived three equilibria, this section examines welfare implications
of these equilibria. In the analysis, we must resort to numerical examples
since the equilibrium condition in each equilibrium involves a complicated
polynomial. In what follows, we assume S0 =0 ,r=0 .1,c= 1 and b2 =0 .5
(b ≈ 0.71).11
(Tables 1 and 2 around here)
Tables 1 and 2 report a comparison among the equilibrium strategies.
When Home (the importing country) is a leader, it chooses a lower initial
tariﬀ than in the Nash equilibrium. This is because the Home government
is motivated to counter the tendency of Foreign to be conservationist.12 In
response to this strategy of Home, Foreign (the exporting country) naturally
increases production. If, on the other hand, Foreign is a leader, it chooses a
lower output earlier on to seek a high price and large rent. Observing this
strategy choice of Foreign, Home retaliates by lowering a tariﬀ for shifting
the Foreign rent. These ﬁndings are well consistent with the outcomes in
static games.13
(Figures 1 and 2 around here)
(Table 3 around here)
Table 3 summarizes the welfare comparisons among equilibria. Not sur-
prisingly, the leader improves its welfare as compared to the Nash equi-
librium, which comes from the deﬁnition of the Stackelberg equilibria. In
contrast, the eﬀect on the follower’s welfare is diﬀerent between the two
Stackelberg equilbiria. If Home leads, welfare of Foreign as well as Home im-
proves, i.e., Home’s leadership entails a Pareto improvement from the Nash
11The detailed derivations of the tables in this paper are available from the authors
upon request.
12Recall Solow’s quiz that the resource monopolist is the conservationist’s best friend.
13Figures 1 and 2 depict the two Stackelberg equilibria in a static setting. In the ﬁgures,
points N,H and F refer to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium with Home’s
leadership and the Stackelberg equilibrium with Foreign’s leadership, respectively.
14equilibrium. However, if Foreign leads, Home (the follower) becomes worse
oﬀ than in the Nash equilibrium. These welfare changes are also conﬁrmed
in Figures 1 and 2 in which static games are assumed.
The third column in Table 3 shows the welfare levels of ROW. It reveals
that the presence of leaderships has a detrimental eﬀect on ROW and that
its welfare is lowest when Foreign is a leader. The last column provides the
welfare of the world, deﬁned as the sum of the three countries’ welfare. We
can easily see that the world welfare is highest when Home is a leader. This
is because, as mentioned just above, this case yields a Pareto improvement
from the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, when Foreign is a leader, the
world welfare is lowest. The reason is that Foreign chooses a much smaller
output than in the Nash case, which reduces consumer surplus of the two
importing countries. As a result, the absolute value of the fall in welfare
of Home and ROW exceeds the welfare gain of Foreign, which leads to the
lowest welfare of the world.
(Figure 3 around here)
Finally, we draw diagrams that depict a dynamic path of welfare of Home
and Foreign. Figure 3 consists of three panels. The top panel gives the time
path of Home welfare under the three diﬀerent scenarios. The middle panel
gives the corresponding time paths of Foreign welfare, and the bottom one
gives time paths of the world welfare. The top panel tells us that Home
welfare is highest when it is a leader until a certain time, but after that time
it is the highest when Foreign is a leader.14 The same observation cannot be
made concerning the Foreign welfare: it is always highest when the Foreign
ﬁrm assumes the leadership. As to the world welfare, the ranking reversal
similar to Home welfare is found.
14However, note that the stock levels are not the same at the point where the two paths
intersect each other.
157 Concluding Remarks
We have explored feedback Stackelberg equilibria in a two-(strategic) country
dynamic game model of an exhaustible resource. Unlike the existing litera-
ture that employs a stagewise Stackelberg solution, we have paid attention
to the hierarchical Stackelberg equilibria. Despite the above contributions,
we have left much unexplored. In particular, we have restricted attention
to linear strategies. However, Shimomura and Xie (2008) have provided an
example of renewable resource exploitation in which there exist nonlinear
feedback strategies that are superior to linear strategies.15 Tackling this
problem in the context of exhaustible resource markets is part of our future
research agenda.
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18α α∗
Nash −0.227475584 −0.160849528
Stackelberg (Home is leader) −0.200588442 −0.163091829
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) −0.16381011 −0.11583124
Table 1: α and α∗ under S0 =0 ,r=0 .1,c= 1 and b2 =0 .5
β β∗
Nash 0.227475584a 0.160849528a
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.200588442a 0.163091829a
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.16381011a 0.11583124a
Table 2: β and β∗ under S0 =0 ,r=0 .1,c= 1 and b2 =0 .5
Home Foreign ROW Total
Nash 0.043383237a2 0.258725708a2 0.015155801a2 0.317264746a2
Home leader 0.043757137a2 0.265989447a2 0.013616879a2 0.323363463a2
Foreign leader 0.028604876a2 0.268337521a2 0.007859424a2 0.304801821a2







Home welfare W ↑
Foreign welfare π ↑
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Home welfare W ↓
Foreign welfare π ↑
O
F
Figure 2: Static Stackelberg equilibrium: Foreign is a leader
21instantaneous welfare of Home
instantaneous welfare of Foreign





Stackelberg (Home is leader)
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader)
Figure 3: Time paths of welfare
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